We have already   seen that the Internet can be a good source of this type of information.  There are also house listings in newspapers   and both of those sources are frequently consulted by buyers even if they   have a realtor.  For some homes on the   market there will be "open houses" which allow potential buyers to   take a look see.  These help buyers not   just to gauge that particular home but also to serve as a benchmark for other   alternatives.
If the information can be found elsewhere, then why use an agent or   broker?  This question is relevant not   just to the real estate market.  Web   sites as automated brokers have clearly made inroads into the travel business   (e.g., expedia.com and travelocity.com) and the stock market investing   business (e.g., ameritrade.com and estocktrading.net).  So one should distinguish a buyer who would   know which alternative to choose if the information on alternatives was   available, from a different buyer who would need help to process that   information and match it to some more abstract categories that are guiding   the buyer's choice.  The former type of   buyer is more likely to use the online service.  The latter is more likely to go with an   agent or broker and in that sense the agent's job is as much educational as   it is to simply provide information.    Some buyer's in the former category may nevertheless go to an agent   either because the agent might have information that is not available from   other sources, or because the agent can get the information more readily.
BLS Real Estate   Agent/Broker Job Description
An interesting issue is whether the agents/brokers have an affect on the   transaction price.  To consider why   this may occur, let us look at two types of incentives that are at work on   the agent.  The first comes from within   the transaction.  Frequently, the   agent's compensation is calculated as a percentage of the selling price (and   frequently the rate is 3%).  So for   example, if the seller got $100,000, the agent for the seller would get   $3,000, as would the agent for the buyer, and the buyer would pay $106,000 to   cover that expenditure.  If both agents   get paid on this percentage basis then both have incentive to get the highest   price possible that will close the deal.    But there is an offsetting incentive in that the agent for the buyer   also has to be concerned with generating additional business and to the   extent that new business comes from referrals, the agent will want the   current buyer to be happy with the transaction price.  Likewise, the buyer will choose an agent in   part based on the agent's good reputation.
A paper that   argues the broker effect is not on price, but rather on time to closure.
ARUEA Paper
Since you may not have experience as a home buyer and may not have dealt with   real estate agents (but if you've rented an apartment the experience may have   been similar) let's try to personalize this issue of agent "moral   hazard" by focusing on a different case that you should be familiar   with.  Moral hazard means the agent   works in his own self-interest first and foremost.  We'll ask if the student-advisor   relationship has moral hazard.    Consider your relationship with your academic advisor, either at present or in the past.  In suggesting courses or instructors for   you to take, do you think your advisor helped you find the best   alternatives?  Do you think the quality   of that advice depends on you knowing your advisor well?
 
 
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